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CASE SUMMARY
C.R. EX REL. RAINVILLE V. EUGENE
SCHOOL DISTRICT 4J: SLOWLY
EXPANDING A SCHOOL’S ABILITY TO
REACH OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
MARY R. LOUNG*

INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution guarantees equal protection under the
law to all citizens regardless of race, color, religion, and gender.1 However, there are special circumstances when constitutional rights can be
restricted. The First Amendment rights of public school students fall
under one of these special circumstances.2 While parents have a responsibility to care for, protect, and discipline their child,3 the responsibility
transfers to the school’s in loco parentis authority when the child becomes a student under their supervision.4 The salient issue then becomes
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; B.B.A.,
Management Information Systems, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX; Multiple Subject
Teaching Credential, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA; Executive Comments
Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review. I would like to thank the Golden Gate University Law
Review Editorial Board, particularly Alex Lemburg, Elizabeth Youngberg, and Andre Andoyan,
without whose guidance this paper would not have been published. I would also like to thank E.H,
E.A.H, and A.H. for their unwavering support and unconditional love.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional rights
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”).
3
Parental responsibility laws vary state to state in terms of duration and level. For an overview of parental responsibility laws organized by state, see Parental Responsibility Laws in All 50
States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C. (June 8, 2016), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/2013/03/parental-responsibility-in-all-50-states.pdf.
4
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
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how to determine when the school’s authority begins and ends.5 The
Ninth Circuit’s decision in C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene School District 4J addressed one incident where the First Amendment rights of a
public school student were restricted even though the speech occurred
off-campus and after school hours.6
I. BACKGROUND
A. PROVIDING A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: REGULATING
STUDENT SPEECH
There are four landmark Supreme Court cases outlining when student speech may be regulated: Bethel School District v. Fraser,7 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,8 Morse v. Frederick,9 and Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District.10 In the order listed
above, each case covers a type of student speech schools may regulate:
(1) lewd, offensive, or vulgar speech,11 (2) school-sponsored, eventbased speech,12 (3) speech promoting illegal drug use among schoolchildren,13 and (4) speech that can foreseeably be found to be “materially
and substantially” disruptive to a school’s educational mission.14 The Supreme Court found reasons in each case to allow schools the ability to
regulate on-campus speech based on the fundamental principle of furthering a school’s “basic educational mission.”15
However, the Supreme Court has yet to address how its precedents
apply to off-campus speech.16 Thus, lower federal courts took over the
responsibility and created various constitutional frameworks for how and
when schools may regulate a student’s off-campus speech.17 The Ninth
Circuit’s C.R. court looked to its own precedent and sister circuits for
guidance.18
5

Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Courts have long
dealt with the tension between students’ First Amendment rights and ‘the special characteristics of
the school environment.’ ” (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
6
C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
7
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675.
8
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
9
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
10
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
11
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 685 (1986).
12
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-73.
13
Morse, 551 U.S. at 403, 410.
14
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
15
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
16
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
17
Id. at 1067-69.
18
C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2016).
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B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff C.R. was a seventh-grade student in the Defendant Eugene
School District 4J (the “School District”).19 In October 2011, over the
course of several days, C.R. and several of his classmates (“older boys”)
teased and harassed two disabled sixth-grade students (“younger students”): a girl (A.I.) and a boy (J.R.).20 C.R., his classmates, A.I., and
J.R. all went to the same school and took the same route home: a bike
path that started on school grounds, crossed into a public park, adjoined
the school’s athletic field, and let out onto a neighboring street.21 There
were no visible markers demarcating the end of school property and the
beginning of the public park.22
The date of the incident leading to C.R.’s suspension was the last of
the escalating encounters.23 On that date, school had ended and C.R. and
his classmates were heading home down a popular student-used path.24
They were a couple of hundred feet from school when they spotted A.I.
and J.R. and began following them.25 At first, the older boys gave A.I.
and J.R. vulgar nicknames and insisted the younger students repeat
them.26 As days progressed, the teasing behavior became more sexual in
nature.27 C.R. and his classmates circled J.R. and A.I. along the path and
asked if they watched pornography.28 One older boy asked if they were
dating and suggested J.R. take A.I. to the local B.J.’s restaurant. This
escalated the vulgarity of the conversation to contain puns with sexual
innuendos using the abbreviation of the oral sex act, “blowjob,” in connection to the restaurant’s name.29 The younger students were told to try
a “B.J.’s” sandwich together because it “tasted good.”30
An instructional aide (“aide”) for the School District was biking
home along the same path when she saw the group of students.31 Concerned by the group’s posture, the aide approached the group and noticed
A.I. looking “a little scared.”32 The aide asked the younger students if
19

Id. at 1146.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1145.
24
Id. at 1146.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
20
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they felt comfortable.33 A.I. replied “no,” prompting the aide to ask the
older boys to leave.34 The aide then walked the two younger students
home.35 As they walked, A.I. recounted what had happened, telling the
aide that the older boys were talking about B.J.’s the restaurant but she
thought it meant something else.36 The aide reported what she had seen
and heard to the school’s vice principal, Katherine Kiraly.37 Kiraly began
an informal investigation.38
Kiraly first interviewed A.I. and J.R.39 A.I. confirmed what the aide
reported and included the other encounters where the older boys made
sexual comments.40 A.I. told Kiraly the final encounter made her feel
unsafe.41
Kiraly then interviewed C.R. separately.42 In C.R.’s first interview,
he denied any wrongdoing.43 School administrators then told C.R. not to
talk about the interview with the other boys involved; he ignored this
request.44
At Kiraly’s interview with the other boys, they confirmed A.I.’s
story and admitted to making inappropriate comments, including the
B.J.’s puns, and knowing the puns referred to oral sex.45 The boys also
confirmed that C.R. participated with them and had talked to them about
his first interview, and one referred to him as the ringleader.46 At C.R.’s
second interview, he admitted to making the inappropriate comments.47
Based on the interviews, school administrators determined the incident to be sexual harassment and that C.R. participated in that harassment.48 The school sent an email to C.R.’s parents outlining the basis for
their decision.49 Accordingly, school administrators then disciplined C.R.
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1147.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
34
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under the School District’s “door-to-door” policy50 for participating in
sexual harassment and issued him a two-day suspension.51
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
C.R.’s parents filed a suit on his behalf against the School District
alleging the School District violated C.R.’s First Amendment, procedural
due process, and substantive due process rights.52 In addition, C.R. alleged claims of defamation, negligence, and retaliation.53 The School
District filed a motion for summary judgment and C.R. filed a crossmotion for summary judgment.54
On September 12, 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon heard the cross-motions for summary judgment.55 The
court analyzed the First Amendment claim under the “material disruption
or invasion of rights” test set forth by Justice William Brennan in Tinker,
which held that
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.56

Thus, under Tinker, schools may restrict and discipline a student’s offcampus speech when the school reasonably believes it might result in
“substantial disruption . . . in the learning environment,” or infringe on
the rights of other students.57
The district court found that the School District acted reasonably in
believing the harassing conduct of C.R. could lead to substantial disruptions at school and that their failure to address the conduct could signal
to students that harassment was tolerated.58 Moreover, the district court
50
The Ninth Circuit does not define the School District’s “door-to-door” policy in its opinion.
However, it can be inferred that the policy allowed the school to discipline its students for inappropriate conduct on their way to and from school. (“[I]t is a reasonable exercise of the School District’s
in loco parentis authority to be concerned with its students’ well-being as they begin their homeward
journey at the end of the school day.” Id. at 1151.)
51
Id. at 1147.
52
C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, No. 6:12-cv-1042-TC, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130463, at *1, *17-18 (D. Or. Sep. 12, 2013), aff’d, 835 F.3d 11-12 (9th Cir. 2016).
53
C.R., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130463, at *1.
54
Id.
55
C.R., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130463.
56
Id. at *14 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
57
Id. at *15 (citing Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069).
58
Id. at *15-16.
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found that the school had an affirmative duty to mitigate and prevent
substantial disruptions.59 Therefore, the school’s imposition of discipline
based on the off-campus conduct was appropriate.60
Turning to C.R.’s due process claims, the district court held that all
that is required to satisfy procedural due process is an “oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation
of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side
of the story”61 which the court concluded the School District followed.62
Next, the district court granted summary judgment to the School
District on C.R.’s substantive due process claim because it lacked a legitimate dispute.63 Last, the district court adjudicated C.R.’s state-law retaliation, defamation, and negligence claims in favor of the School District
for being improperly raised.64 Therefore, the district court declined to
exercise jurisdiction over these claims.65
In sum, the district court granted the School District’s summary
judgment motion, denied C.R.’s cross-motion for summary judgment,
and dismissed the action.66 C.R. then timely appealed the district court’s
ruling to the Ninth Circuit.67
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit addressed only C.R.’s First Amendment and due
process claims.68 Heard before a three-judge panel, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the School District and upheld the School District’s decision to impose a two-day
suspension on C.R.69

59

Id. at *6.
Id.
61
Id. at *17 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)).
62
Id. at *18.
63
Id. at *19.
64
Id. at *7-8 (noting that a plaintiff may not raise a new allegation for the first time in
response to a summary-judgment motion).
65
In addition to being improperly raised, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the state-law claims because the claims in which they had original jurisdiction would be dismissed. See id. at *21.
66
Id. at *21.
67
C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2016).
68
Id. (noting in footnote 2 that C.R.’s other state-law claims were not at issue in the appeal).
69
Id. at 1145-46.
60
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A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF THE
AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH
First, the Ninth Circuit focused on C.R.’s First Amendment claim.70
The court provided the constitutional framework for regulating student
speech based on the four leading Supreme Court cases as cited above.71
Because the lower courts were left with the task of creating their own
tests for regulating off-campus speech, the C.R. court cited two Ninth
Circuit cases, LaVine and Wynar.72 The issue in both cases was whether
schools may regulate students’ off-campus speech. Both times, the court
held that schools may do so.73 The Wynar court identified two tests used
by sister circuits: the Fourth Circuit’s “nexus” test and the Eighth Circuit’s “reasonably foreseeable” test.74 The “nexus” test asks if the student’s off-campus speech is closely tied enough to the school to permit
regulating it.75 The “reasonably foreseeable” test asks “whether it was
‘reasonably foreseeable’ that off-campus speech would reach the
school.”76 Wynar declined to choose between the two tests and instead
applied both.77 Further, the C.R. court mentioned a recent Fifth Circuit
case where the court chose a different approach but also held that a
school may regulate off-campus speech.78 Ultimately, the C.R. court
concluded that whatever approach a court decides, all courts routinely
engage in a “circumstance-specific” inquiry to determine whether a
school may discipline a student for off-campus speech.79
Following Wynar, the C.R. court applied both the “nexus” test and
the “reasonably foreseeable” test and found that the School District also
met both tests and therefore had authority to regulate C.R.’s off-campus
speech.80 The court listed the unique facts of the case leading to its decision: the off-campus speech occurred right after school, near school
grounds, and was exclusively between students; it was on property
closely tied to the school with no visual marker indicating it was off70

Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1148-49.
72
Id. at 1149.
73
Id.
74
Id. (summarizing Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013)
(citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); and S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit
R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012))).
75
Id. (citing Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573).
76
Id. (citing S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 777).
77
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013).
78
C.R., 835 F.3d at 1149-50 (citing Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir.
2015) (en banc)).
79
Id. at 1150.
80
Id. at 1151.
71
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campus; and the path was frequently used by the students for the purpose
of travelling to and from school.81 Moreover, because of the path’s setting and frequent use, the court found that the school’s schedule and
location was what tied the students involved in the incident together.82
Subsequently, the School District could reasonably expect the harassment to reach school grounds and into the students’ school experience.83
The Ninth Circuit then analyzed whether C.R.’s suspension was permissible under the “invasion of rights” prong of Tinker’s “material disruption or invasion of rights” test.84 The court noted that sexual
harassment by its definition invaded the rights of the victim “because it
positions the target as a sexual object . . . threatening the individual’s
sense of physical . . . emotional and psychological security,” and left the
students feeling unsafe at school.85 Thus, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the district court and affirmed that because C.R.’s speech interfered with
the younger students’ right to be secured and left alone, the suspension
was permissible.86
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Next, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that the Constitution only required
an informal process for a school-imposed suspension of ten or fewer
days.87 The court dismissed C.R.’s allegation that the School District did
not take proper steps in providing him with sufficient due process notice
when it failed to tell him the specific rules he allegedly violated and how
he violated them.88 The court held both steps were not constitutionally
required.89 Hence, following the due process requirements outlined by
the district court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the School District did
not violate C.R.’s due process rights.90
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Finally, the Ninth Circuit addressed C.R.’s substantive due process
interest claim in his right to maintain a clean school record.91 The court
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
82

at 1152.
at 1151.
at 1152.
at 1152-53.
at 1153.

at 1154.
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generalized that substantive due process exists to “protect[ ] an individual’s fundamental rights to liberty and bodily autonomy.”92 Because
maintaining a clean record is not considered a fundamental right, the
court dismissed the claim.93
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION
A. REAFFIRMING A SCHOOL’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE OF OFFCAMPUS SPEECH
The Ninth Circuit noted that in this digital age, recent cases, like
Wynar, regarding a school’s authority to discipline a student for off-campus harassment often involved internet speech.94 The Ninth Circuit made
clear that the issue in this case was different and its decision was not only
a first for the court but also restricted to the unique facts presented by
this case.95 The Ninth Circuit separated this case from others in that: the
incident happened right after school, the offending comments were communicated in-person, and the students were only a few hundred feet from
campus.96
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit declined to hold whether its decision
of allowing schools to regulate off-campus public speech would extend
to public places in general.97 The C.R. court noted that off-campus
speech at a mall or movie theater, for example, might present a different
case.98 Nevertheless, while the court declined to expand its decision to
encompass internet speech or public places in general, the court did affirm for the third time that schools may regulate off-campus speech.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in C.R. could allow more schools to
implement a “door-to-door” policy without fear of violating First
Amendment rights. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held it was reasonable for a
school to concern itself with their students’ safety when they begin their
travel home from school.99 Also, the court noted that overtly sexual
speech that especially targeted young students deserved to fall under
Tinker’s “interference with the rights of others” scope.100 Therefore,
schools with young students should be aware that they may reasonably
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id. at 1150, 1154-55.
95
Id. at 1150, 1152.
96
Id. at 1155.
97
Id. at 1151.
98
Id. at 1151 n.4.
99
Id. at 1151.
100
Id. at 1152-53.
93
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discipline a student for off-campus sexual harassment directed in-person
at another student. Conversely, students and their parents should now
know that the student’s First Amendment and due process rights could be
restricted under similar circumstances.
B. PREDICTIONS OF HOW LOWER COURTS OR OTHER CIRCUITS MAY
REACT TO THIS HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit laid out a clear path on what steps a school must
take for its actions to survive First Amendment scrutiny. This path created a constitutional framework for district courts to follow when analyzing a school’s regulation of off-campus speech. First, district courts
should use both the “nexus” test and the “reasonably foreseeable” test
when considering whether the school could permissibly regulate a student’s off-campus speech. Although there is some uncertainty as to
whether a district court could use just one test, the Wynar and C.R.
courts used both tests in their analyses. Next, the district courts could use
either prong of Tinker’s “material disruption or invasion of rights” test to
decide whether the school’s regulation of a student’s off-campus speech
complied with First Amendment’s requirements.
The Ninth Circuit also mentioned several tests from sister circuits. In
fact, the Wynar and C.R. courts used tests from the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits in their analysis, thus supporting the validity of both. Additionally, the C.R. court gave credibility to the Eighth Circuit’s test by using it
as support in proving one of its points. Other circuits may react to the
holding in C.R. by following or supporting it, thus creating a more commonly accepted standard.
IV. CONCLUSION
The expansion of a school’s duty to regulate some types of on-campus speech to include some types of off-campus speech increases a
school’s ability to broaden a safer learning environment. The current
constitutional framework regarding regulating student speech is changing
to match the times and determining the scope of the school’s ability to
constitutionally restrict it is a delicate balancing act. Indeed, as the Ninth
Circuit said, courts are consistently engaged in a “circumstance-specific
inquiry” in the regulation of student speech.101 Especially in this digital
age, courts are often presented with special circumstances that require
careful consideration in addressing off-campus student conduct. Al101

Id. at 1150.
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though the C.R. court called the instant issue an “analog problem”102
unrelated to internet speech, the Ninth Circuit continued to recognize that
“[s]chools must achieve a balance between protecting the safety and
well-being of their students and respecting those same students’ constitutional rights.”103 The C.R. court decided the case accordingly. Hence, the
scope of a school’s ability to regulate off-campus speech expanded, even
if by a fraction.

102
103

Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1148.
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